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Abstract
We study discrete versions of the envy-free cake-cutting problem, in-
volving one-dimensional necklaces of beads and two-dimensional grids of
beads. In both cases beads are indivisible, in contrast to cakes which are
continuously divisible, but a general theme of our methods is an appeal
to continuous cake-cutting ideas to achieve envy-free and approximate
envy-free divisions of discrete objects. (This problem is distinct from the
“necklace-splitting problem” more commonly studied, which does not in-
volve envy-freeness.) Our main result in two dimensions is an envy-free
division of a grid of beads under certain conditions on the preferences,
with near-vertical cuts.
Keywords : Discrete cake-cutting, Envy-free divisions, Necklace splitting
1 Introduction
The archetypal fair-division problem considers a division of cake among several
players and seeks to find allocations that players consider “fair”. One such
notion of fairness is that of envy-freeness. An allocation is called envy-free if
every player is happy with the piece they are assigned and would not prefer to
trade with another player. Under mild assumptions, the cake cutting problem
has a solution (see e.g., [11]):
Theorem 1 (Envy-Free Cake-Cutting). For any set of n players who prefer cake
to no cake and have closed preference sets, there exists an envy-free allocation
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of cake using (n − 1) cuts. Furthermore, there exists a finite ǫ-approximate
algorithm.
The existence of envy-free divisions has been known since Neyman [8], with
recent attention paid to finding constructive proofs with potential for applica-
tions. The first constructive n-player envy-free solution is due to Brams and
Taylor [4]. It is a finite but unbounded procedure— meaning that it will termi-
nate but, depending on the preferences, the number of steps may be arbitrarily
large! Moreover, the cake could be divided into a huge number of pieces. Aziz
and Mackenzie [2] recently developed a bounded n-person procedure, though
even for small n it can take an astronomical number of steps and cuts to re-
solve.
Other methods [9, 11] produce an approximate envy-free division, i.e., a di-
vision in which each player feels their piece is within ǫ of being the best piece in
their estimation. An advantage to approximate procedures is that the number of
steps and cuts is more manageable, and so has the possibility of being practical.
One such method, due to Simmons and described in [11], uses Sperner’s lemma
to accomplish a division by a minimal number of pieces. Hence it requires only
(n− 1) cuts.
In spirit of work such as [7], we consider a discrete analogue of the classical
cake-cutting problem in which a number of indivisible beads along a line is
to be allocated in an envy-free way. We call this the problem of envy-free
necklace-cutting. Problems involving distributing indivisible goods has received
considerable attention in the economics and fair division literature (see, e.g., [5]
and [6]), but with less emphasis on geometric constraints. Barbanel’s work [3]
studies and organizes fair division under a geometric framework, but assumes
divisible1 goods. Thus, we think our problem represents a potentially fruitful
avenue of research as it combines having indivisible goods and having geometric
constraints. Another representative of such problems is the necklace-splitting
problem, in which a string of k types of beads is to be split among n thieves so
that each thief receives the same number of each type of bead. (See e.g., [1]).
This problem is different from our problem as it focuses on balancing the pieces
for the k types simultaneously and does not involve the thieves having different
preferences for the beads.
The necklace cutting problem is like the traditional cake-cutting problem,
but the discreteness of the problem means an envy-free division may not nec-
essarily exist. The simplest example is when we have a single bead valued by
every player. If we give the bead to one player, all other players will be envious.
Problem. It is natural to consider the following as fundamental problems for
studying envy-free necklace-cutting:
• What additional assumptions do we need to make to guarantee an envy-free
division exists?
1Strictly speaking, [3] cares about non-atomic preferences, which is defined as when a
player cannot put nontrivial value on a subset A of a geometric space (analogous to a piece
of cake) unless A has a subset B with strictly less but nonzero value to the player. However,
this definition captures the intuition of divisible goods.
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• What algorithm produces such divisions?
• When envy-free is impossible, what is the best we can do? For example,
what is the smallest ǫ for which we can guarantee an ǫ-envy-free division?
Marenco and Tetzlaff [7] initiated the study of envy-free necklace-cutting by
considering the case where each bead is valuable to exactly one player. (They
don’t use the language of necklace-cutting, but speak of atoms arranged on an
interval.) Appealing to the techniques in [11] for traditional cake-cutting, they
use a combinatorial result known as Sperner’s lemma to find “nearby” divisions
of the necklace, one for each player, in which each player prefers a different piece
of the necklace in their division. The location of cuts in these divisions differs
by only one bead for each knife, and the idea is to use the location of the cuts
to determine a final division that will be envy-free for all players. The position
of each knife in the final division is given by the position of that knife in the
splitting associated to the player who values the contested bead.
We build on their work by examining the questions above for different classes
of constraints, including more general preferences where several players may
value each bead (Section 3), and a two-dimensional arrangement of the beads
(Section 4).
2 A cake-cutting model for envy-free necklace-
cutting
We wish to divide an open necklace of indivisible beads, but a recurring tech-
nique of this paper is to cut the cake analogue of a necklace (so that beads are
potentially divided) and then slide the cuts so they do not divide beads.
We model this by considering the necklace as an interval [0, ℓ], in which
the beads are now intervals between consecutive integers. Viewed as a cake,
cuts may be made at any point, but to be a necklace-cutting, cuts must lie at
integers. See Figure 1.
Figure 1: Two equivalent ways of picturing a discrete necklace cut into three
strings of beads.
We assume each player P has a nonnegative, additive, real-valued valuation
function vP defined on any possible string of beads, but because we will be
cutting cake analogues of the necklace, we define vP on any fraction of a bead
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to be that same fraction of the valuation of a full bead. In other words, we
imagine the valuation of a bead to be uniformly distributed over the bead.
This gives rise to a preference relation between each two possible strings of
beads, where player P prefers string A to B if and only if vP (A) ≥ vP (B).
We stress that a player may prefer several strings of beads if they value them
equally. If A is preferred to B but not vice-versa, we say that the player strictly
prefers A to B.
3 Non-Monolithic Preferences
Marenco and Tetzlaff [7] showed that we can achieve an envy-free division of
the necklace in the case where each bead is valued by only one player. We say
players have monolithic preferences in this case, and we can label beads by the
identities of the players who value them. See Figure 2 for an example.
A B C C A
A B C
Figure 2: A discrete necklace where players have monolithic preferences, cut by
2 cuts into 3 strings of beads. The labels in the necklace denote the players who
value those beads; the labels above the necklace denotes the allocation. This
particular allocation is envy-free if A has the same valuation for both A-beads.
Theorem 2. (Marenco–Tetzlaff) If n players with monolithic preferences are to
divide a necklace of beads, then there exists an envy-free division of the necklace
using only (n− 1) cuts.
We wish to study the case where each bead may be valued by more than one
player. After all, the problem of fair division is most interesting when players
bicker over items that are mutually desired. Thus, unless otherwise stated, we
assume valuation functions vP (b) can be positive for any player P and for any
bead b. We’ve already seen an example in Section 1 that we cannot guarantee
an envy-free division in all cases. A less trivial example is given in Figure 3.
However, just because we cannot guarantee an envy-free division does not
mean we cannot come close. As in [11], call a division ǫ-envy-free if for each
player, the other strings are worth no more than ǫ plus the value of the string
assigned to them. Note that a division is 0-envy-free if and only if it is envy-free.
We achieve the following result:
Theorem 3. For a necklace of beads, where the value of each bead is at most s
to every player, there always exists an ǫ-envy-free division of the necklace among
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A B AB A B
Figure 3: If each player values each bead with their label equally, then there is
no envy-free division between players A and B; they will fight over the middle
bead.
n players using only (n − 1) cuts with ǫ < 2s. In particular, there is always a
(2s)-envy-free division.
Proof. Represent our necklace of ℓ beads as the interval [0, ℓ] such that beads
are the intervals between consecutive integers and players’ valuations of each
bead are uniformly distributed over the bead’s interval. If we allow the cuts
to be made at non-integer points, Theorem 1 guarantees that there exists an
envy-free division, D, of the interval. We begin with the division D and shift
any cuts that divide a bead by rounding each such cut to the nearest integral
point. For example, if a cut is at x = 1.2, shift it so it is at x = 1.0. If a cut is
at a half-integer, then we always round to the right.
Suppose player P were assigned a string of beads with value v in D. Then
this rounding process decreases P ’s valuation by at most s/2 at the left end and
strictly less than s/2 at the right end, so P ’s valuation of her piece decreases by
strictly less than s. Furthermore, from the perspective of P , the value of any
other piece in D increases by at most s by the same logic. Thus, P ’s envy in
the final division, where all the cuts are now at integer points, is strictly less
than 2s.
If we specialize to the situation where the valuations are integral, the strict-
ness of the inequality above can be quite useful. One such situation is when the
only opinion a player has towards a bead is that they either desire the bead or
are indifferent to the bead. We model this situation by assigning each bead’s
worth to a player as either exactly 1 or 0 respectively. In this case, we obtain:
Corollary 1. For n players dividing a necklace of beads with valuations taking
values either 0 or 1, there always exists a 1-envy-free division using only (n−1)
cuts.
Proof. Theorem 3 shows that we can get the maximum envy to be strictly less
than 2. However, since the valuations are sums of 1’s and 0’s, the envy must be
an integer and so the envy is bounded above by 1.
5
4 Two Dimensional Divisions: a Grid of Beads
In this section, we consider a 2-dimensional grid of indivisible beads that we
wish to divide in an envy-free way. We can imagine that there are strings in
the 4 cardinal directions connecting the beads; we can also just imagine that
the beads are on a valueless “quilt” which is to be cut. This is a generalization
of cake-cutting problem in two-dimensions, which has been studied (e.g., [10]),
but for divisible goods. An important consideration in two-dimensional division
is the geometry of the pieces. Our main theorem is Theorem 4, which uses a
“sliding” method remniscent of network flow problems from computer science.
Segal-Halevi (personal communication, Nov. 2015) has pointed out that an
envy-free division of a grid of beads can be accomplished by the Marenco-Tetzlaff
result by cutting the grid into a one-dimensional necklace along a snake-like path
that winds back and forth across the rows of the grid, from top to bottom. (In
fact, any Hamiltonian path along the grid graph would do.) This would achieve
an an envy-free division with pieces that are connected in the original grid. He
also notes that in the case of preferences that are not necessarily monolithic,
our Theorem 3 would yield an (2s)-envy-free division where s is the maximum
valuation of any bead by any player.
However, we desire our pieces to align with the geometry of the grid in
near-vertical cuts, which could be useful if, for instance, the rectangular grid
represented a grid of resources to be split up by players, and for some geometric
reason, we need the pieces to “connect” vertically to resources at the top and the
bottom of the grid. Perhaps the top of the grid is access to a waterway useful
for trade, and the bottom of the grid is access to a canyon of raw materials.
This situation may be contrived, but we believe the geometric constraint is
interesting and the methods generated by this paper useful for further analysis.
If we demand actual vertical cuts, Theorem 3 yields an immediate corollary:
Corollary 2. Consider a 2-dimensional grid of beads. Suppose s is the highest
total valuation of the beads in a column by any player. Then there exists an
ǫ-envy-free division among n players using (n− 1) vertical cuts, where ǫ < 2s.
Proof. We model our grid of beads as the region [0, k] × [0, ℓ] such that each
square is a bead and the players’ valuations are spread uniformly across each
bead. We can now treat our grid as a 1× ℓ necklace by summing the valuations
of the i-th column to obtain the valuation of the i-th bead. Applying Theorem 3
gives the result.
However, it seems that we can do significantly better if we relax our require-
ment so that cuts are allowed to be “near-vertical”. For what follows, define a
near-vertical cut of a grid to be a path of edges, all lying within one vertical
column of the grid, that separate the squares into two sets (as a Jordan curve).
We consider two cuts to be non-intersecting if the cuts do not intersect each
other transversely, that is, there do not exist two points of a cut such that they
are in the interiors of the two different sets created by the other cut.
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Theorem 4. Suppose n players have monolithic preferences over a 2-dimensional
grid of beads with valuations taking values either 0 or 1. Then there exists an
envy-free division of the grid using (n− 1) non-intersecting near-vertical cuts.
Figure 4: The grid is cut via 2 cuts into 3 pieces, each (barely) path-connected
if we allow movement along the cuts themselves. The right is a visualization of
this division interpreted as beads on a valueless “quilt.”
Proof. Again, we model our grid of beads as the region [0, k]× [0, ℓ]. By Theo-
rem 1, there exists an envy-free division of the grid using (n−1) parallel vertical
cuts. We think of each of these vertical cuts as a union of k vertical edges. We
call such a vertical edge integral if its x-coordinate is integral and non-integral
otherwise. Our strategy is to slide non-integral vertical edges left or right so they
become integral while keeping them connected via horizontal edges along the
integral y-coordinates. We do this while holding the relative left-to-right order
of the (n − 1) vertical edges on each horizontal strip constant, thus generating
the desired cuts for the discrete grid of squares.
We say that a vertical edge borders players P and Q if the two adjacent
pieces allocated by the original envy-free allocation belong to P and Q. First,
consider any bead S desired by player P such that at least one vertical edge
going through S borders P . In this case, we can allocate the bead completely
to player P (by moving all edges in S left of P ’s piece to S’s left boundary
and all edges in S right of P ’s piece to S’s right boundary). Due to monolithic
preferences, this gives player P a strictly more valuable piece and does not
affect the preferences and envy of other players, as only P cares about the bead.
Doing this for all beads ensures two conditions now hold for our (still envy-free)
division D:
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• for every player, P , D assigns an integral amount of beads that player P
values to player P (if not, then there must be some non-integral vertical
edge bordering P somewhere);
• if a bead desired by P contains a non-integral vertical edge bordering P1
and P2, then neither P1 nor P2 can be P .
Our strategy to move the remaining non-integral edges is as follows. Sup-
pose we have at least one non-integral vertical edge somewhere in our envy-free
division. We describe a sliding process such that:
• we stay envy-free at all times,
• any time a non-integral edge slides into another, we consider the two
edges to have merged into a single edge (and sliding the resulting edge
corresponds to the underlying edges moving together as a group), and
• any time a non-integral edge becomes integral, we no longer slide it.
When a non-integral edge slides into another edge or becomes integral, the
number of non-integral edges decreases by one; we can then repeat this process
until all non-integral edges become integral. Thus, it suffices to show that we
can always perform this sliding process without losing the envy-free property.
Consider any bead S with non-integral vertical edges going through it, de-
sired by player P . Say that S is contested by Q if Q’s piece contains part of S.
Let the set of players contesting S contain P1 and P2 (recall that neither can
be P ). We say we donate from P1 to P2 through S if we slide the non-integral
vertical edges through S in a (unique) way that the P1 piece in S decreases at
a constant speed, the P2 piece in S increases at the same constant speed, and
the other pieces in S stay at constant size. Donating from P1 to P2 through S
keeping the division envy-free results in one of the following:
• the P1 part of S becomes empty, which causes the number of non-integral
edges to decrease, or
• P values P2’s piece exactly equal to her own, in which case any further
donation to P2 from P1 would make P envious of P2.
Suppose there exists at least one remaining bead desired by player P with
at least one non-integral edge going through it. We define an auxiliary graph
G with vertices indexed by players who are not P . For each bead S desired
by player P with at least one non-integral edge, draw an edge in G labeled by
S with endpoints P1 and P2 for every pair such that a non-integral edge in S
borders P1 and P2 (we allow multiple edges in G). We have two cases:
• If we have a cycle (with no repeated vertices) in G of the form
P1 → P2 → · · · → Pk → P1,
then we can simultaneously donate from P1 to P2 (through the bead cor-
responding to the edge between P1 and P2 in G), P2 to P3, etc. through
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Pk to P1. Since P ’s valuation of all the Pi’s pieces are constant (each piece
is donating and being donated to at the same rate), at some point at least
one of the parts belonging to some Pi in one of these beads becomes 0,
corresponding to a decrease in the number of non-integral vertical edges.
• If we do not have a cycle, then some vertex must have degree 1. This
means there is some bead S desired by P and contested by Q 6= P where
Q does not have a fractional piece of a bead desired by P anywhere else.
This means P ’s valuation of Q’s piece has fractional part exactly equal to
Q’s amount in S. Because P ’s evaluation of P ’s own piece is currently
integral, we can give the entire bead S to Q without fear that P will
become envious of Q.
For an example of this process, see Figure 5.
C
C
A
A
B
B
A
B
C B A
C
C
A
A
B
B
A
B
C B A
Figure 5: Left: an envy-free cut where A values all 3 pieces equally. We wish to
move the non-integral vertical edges, but doing either in isolation would cause
A envy. Thus, we slide the top edge left at the same rate that the bottom edge
slides right, keeping A envy-free, until they slide to integral points.
In both cases, we strictly decrease the number of non-integral vertical edges.
Thus, we are able to perturb the vertical edges until all edges are integral so
that the cut is near-vertical, in which case we have an envy-free allocation of
the grid of beads.
From the proof, we observe that a vertical edge through a bead S in the
original division can move to the left or right boundary of S. This means in
the worst case, we can get some disjoint-looking pieces, with each vertical cut
having a possible horizontal deviation of distance at most 1; for an example, see
Figure 4. However, we maintained the vertical nature of the pieces, as desired.
This proof only uses the 0-1 constraint in the second bullet point above when
resolving the degree 1 nodes. It would be interesting to see if this proof could
be extended to more general preferences.
9
5 Acknowledgments
This work began at the 2014 AMS Mathematics Research Community - Al-
gebraic and Geometric Methods in Applied Discrete Mathematics, which was
supported by NSF DMS-1321794. It was finished while two of the authors were
in residence at at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute in Berkeley,
California, during the Fall 2017 semester where they were supported by the Na-
tional Science Foundation under Grant No. DMS-1440140. Su was supported
partially by NSF Grant DMS-1002938. We thank Boris Alexeev for valuable
conversation. We also thank Erel Segal-Halevi for his valuable comments in
Section 4.
References
[1] Noga Alon, Splitting necklaces, Advances in Mathematics 63 (1987), no. 3, 247–253.
[2] Haris Aziz and Simon Mackenzie, A discrete and bounded envy-free cake cutting protocol
for any number of agents, CoRR abs/1604.03655 (2016).
[3] J.B. Barbanel and A.D. Taylor, The geometry of efficient fair division, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005.
[4] Steven J Brams and Alan D Taylor, An envy-free cake division protocol, American Math-
ematical Monthly (1995), 9–18.
[5] , Fair division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution, Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
[6] R.J. Lipton, E. Markakis, E. Mossel, and A. Saberi, On approximately fair allocations
of indivisible goods, Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference of Electronic Commerce
(2004), 125–131.
[7] Javier Marenco and Toma´s Tetzlaff, Envy-free division of discrete cakes, Electronic Notes
in Discrete Mathematics 37 (2011), 231–236.
[8] J Neyman, Un theoreme d’existence, CR Acade. Sci. Paris 222 (1946), 843–845.
[9] J. Robertson and W. Webb, Cake-cutting algorithms: Be fair if you can, Ak Peters Series,
Taylor & Francis, 1998.
[10] Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, and Yonatan Aumann, Fair and
square: Cake-cutting in two dimensions, Journal of Mathematical Economics 70 (2017),
1–28.
[11] Francis Edward Su, Rental harmony: Sperner’s lemma in fair division, American Math-
ematical Monthly (1999), 930–942.
10
